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ABSTRACT 
 
Daniel M. Layman: Bias Crime Statutes: A Qualified Liberal Defense 
(Under the direction of Gerald J. Postema) 
 
 Since American legislatures began passing bias crime statutes (which set more severe 
penalties for crimes committed from biased motives) in the 1980s, many legal philosophers 
have argued that such statutes are unjust on the grounds that they punish character traits and 
feelings rather than actions and intentions. It is unjust to punish character traits and feelings, 
these authors have supposed, because character traits and feelings are not under agents’ direct 
autonomous control. I argue that while it is unjust for governments to punish feelings and 
character traits, not all bias elements of crimes are feelings or character traits. Rather, some 
bias elements of crimes are intentions. I urge that in cases of biased crime in which the bias 
element in play is an intention, governments may punish the crime more severely than 
parallel non-biased crimes without violating the requirement not to punish what is not under 
agents’ direct autonomous control.  
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1. The Action Condition on Criminal Punishment 
 
Ever since American legislatures began passing laws to enhance penalties for crimes 
committed from biased motives, many philosophers and legal theorists have objected to such 
laws on the grounds that they punish feeling and character rather than action. These authors, 
nearly all of whom work in the broadly classical liberal tradition,1 argue that it is a necessary 
condition of the justice of a criminal law that it punishes nothing but agent actions, and that 
laws enhancing penalties for bias (henceforth ‘bias crime laws’) one and all fail to meet this 
condition.2 Let’s call this the action condition on criminal punishment.3 The action condition 
                                                 
1
 It is important to note that not all liberals, and not even all broadly classical liberals, hold this view. Andrew 
Altman, for instance, offers a liberal argument from public reason for the justice of bias crime laws. See 
Altman, “The Democratic Legitimacy of Bias Crime Laws: Public Reason and Political Process.” Law and 
Philosophy 20 (2) (2001): 141-173. Furthermore, it is important to note here that it is not at all clear to what 
extent the best known historical framers of classical liberalism, such as Mill and Kant, would have been willing 
to sign on to this contemporary liberal understanding of the scope of the criminal law. My own view is that Mill 
most likely would not have been willing to sign on while Kant would have been. Although Mill explicitly states 
in On Liberty that the government may not exercise coercion against individuals merely on account of their 
possessing thoughts and feelings on the grounds that any such policy of coercion would not conduce to utility, 
there is no clear indication that he would object to punishing thoughts and feelings if they were shown to have a 
clear causal relation to harmful external behavior. Indeed, given the utilitarian foundations of Mill’s liberalism, 
it would have been odd for him to object to such punishment. Kant on the other hand, explicitly limits the scope 
of justice (Recht) to external action understood as deeds, by which Kant means something like chosen, agential 
actions. Furthermore, his defense of this limitation is grounded in his deontological understanding of freedom 
and its value rather than in a consequentialist theory. For Mill’s treatment, see On Liberty. Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2003: Ch.1. For Kant’s treatment, see his Doctrine of Right in The Metaphysics of Morals. 
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996.  
 
2
 See Susan Gellman, “Hate Crime Laws are Thought Crime Laws,” Annual Survey of American Law 1992/3:  
514-515, and “Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail, But Can Words Increase Your Sentence? Constitutional 
and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws.” UCLA Law Review 39 (1991): 333-396. See also Craig P. 
Gaumer, “Punishment for Prejudice: A Comment on the Constitutionality of and Utility of State Statutory 
Responses to the Problem of Hate Crime,” South Dakota Law Review 39 (1994): .1-48. See also Anthony M. 
Dillof, “Punishing Bias: An Examination of the Theoretical Foundations of Bias Crime Statutes,” Northwestern 
University Law Review 91 (1997): 1015-1081. 
 
3
 It is important not to confuse the action condition with criminal law’s act requirement, which has traditionally 
been understood as requiring that a person must have performed a “willed muscular contraction” in order to be 
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should be understood as a side constraint on how governments may use the criminal law to 
address societal ills. If a certain kind of behavior is more detrimental to society than a 
criminal punishment for the behavior would be, then governments have at least at least some 
degree of reason to consider criminalizing it. But governments must act, in this respect as in 
others, within the constraints of justice, and the action condition is such a constraint.  
Perhaps the most sophisticated and rigorous criticisms of bias crime laws along these 
lines have been offered by Heidi Hurd and Michael Moore, both in their individual efforts 
and in their collaborative work.4 Hurd and Moore argue that the restriction of the criminal 
law to action alone is one of the core tenets of political liberalism, a doctrine they understand 
as (rightly and properly) underwriting at least a great deal of the Anglo-American legal 
tradition. They write together: “If hatred and bias constitute new conditions of legal 
culpability, then the criminal law has been quite radically altered…For the criminal law to 
punish persons for bad emotions or bad character is for it to move from an act-centered 
theory of punishment to a character-centered theory, and so from a liberal agenda to a 
perfectionist one.”5 Since Hurd and Moore take the current, liberal structure of the criminal 
law to be a just structure, this charge of innovation is a charge of injustice as well.  
While Hurd and Moore take punishing for character and feeling to be at odds with a 
just liberal scheme of criminal punishment, they do not have the same view about punishing 
for intentions. Indeed, they recognize that liberal criminal law has traditionally used 
                                                 
charged with a crime. On this point, see George Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law. New York: Oxford, 2000: 
421. 
 
4
 See Heidi Hurd and Michael Moore. “Punishing Hatred and Prejudice.” Stanford Law Review 56 (2004): 
1081-1146. See also Heidi Hurd, “Why Liberals Should Hate “Hate Crime Legislation.” Law and Philosophy 
20 (2) (2001): 215-232. 
 
5
 Hurd and Moore 1084 
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intentions to distinguish between types of criminal offense, and they hold that in doing so it 
has not strayed from its act-centered orientation.6 Specific intent crimes (such as burglary) 
and crimes of attempt (such as attempted murder), they point out, are prime examples.7 Bias 
crimes, they suppose, do not punish criminals for trying to bring about further states of 
affairs other than the deaths, bodily damage, etc. that all violent criminals try to bring about, 
so Hurd and Moore insist that bias crime laws focus purely on motives as distinct from 
intentions. They write: 
To explain a defendant’s action as a product of hatred is not itself to attribute 
to him a desire to bring about some further state of affairs. It is, rather, to 
characterize his action as a product of a particular passion within which he 
was gripped at the time…We speak of emotions “motivating actions…but 
when we say such things, we are not explaining others’ conduct by reference 
to their future goals.8  
 
 So according to Hurd and Moore, people do oftentimes commit crimes with 
intentions that are especially bad, and it is not unjust to designate such crimes using special, 
more serious criminal categories.  But as a matter of fact, they argue, no bias crime laws 
punish intentions. Rather, they exclusively punish feelings and values. Consequently, bias 
crime statutes are always unjust. 
 One might reasonably ask at this point why it is right to think that the action condition 
is a side constraint on the just use of the criminal law, and why the action condition allows 
governments to take intentions, but not feelings and character traits, into account when 
designating crimes and their sentences. Hurd suggests that both the action condition and the 
privileged status of intentions with respect to this condition follow from a more basic 
                                                 
6
 Hurd and Moore 1121-26 
7
 Hurd and Moore 1121 
8
 Hurd and Moore 1122-3 
 4
restriction on the just use of criminal law, namely that it is always unjust for governments to 
punish people for what is not under their autonomous control. She writes: 
We cannot abandon our emotions and (dispositional) beliefs the way we can 
abandon our goals—i.e., simply by choice. Thus, criminal legislation that 
targets emotions and dispositional beliefs targets things that are not fully or 
readily within defendants’ immediate control. And if law ought not to punish 
us for things that we cannot autonomously affect, then hate and bias crime 
legislation is suspect for doing just that.9 
 
 When we act autonomously, we act on goals that we set for ourselves, and which we 
might not have set and may later abandon at will. Acting autonomously just is to act in a way 
that is explained by autonomously established goals. Furthermore, inasmuch as we 
autonomously commit to a goal (and are rational), we set ourselves in action toward that goal 
to whatever extent we are capable; this is Kant's point when he sets out his hypothetical 
imperative.10 So intentions, where intentions are understood as rationally established goals, 
are the very things that set action apart as autonomous, and so fit for praise, blame, and, most 
importantly in the present context, punishment. 
 Although this sketch of the relationship between intentions-as-goals and autonomous 
action would require a more thorough treatment in order to be convincing to someone who is 
not already sympathetic, there can be no doubt that it is at least intuitively plausible. 
Furthermore, it seems to be born out to a considerable degree in the criminal law, perhaps 
especially inasmuch as provocation and emotional distress count as mitigating factors there. 
The Model Penal Code, for instance, specifies that in cases where a criminal’s behavior is 
largely explained not by her own judgment but rather by an intense passion that temporarily 
                                                 
9
 Hurd 226 
 
10
 Immanuel Kant. Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. 3rd ed. Trans. James W. Ellington. Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1993: 414. 
 5
wrests control of her behavior from her, the passion is a mitigating factor.11 Where an agent 
lacks autonomous control of her behavior via her judgments, the law takes that agent’s 
behavior to be less completely imputable. In virtue of the widespread support that this picture 
of the relationship between action and intention enjoys in the contexts of law and liberal 
political thought, I will not undertake to defend it here, and I will assume in what follows that 
it is correct. 
 One might worry that privileging intention in this way leaves no room for the mens 
rea elements of knowledge and recklessness. I do not think, however, that this ought to be a 
source of concern. In cases where knowledge is a pertinent mens rea element, one must still 
carry out an action while possessing the relevant knowledge in order to commit the crime. 
For instance, if it is a crime to kill a police officer while knowing she is a police officer, a 
suspect cannot be found guilty of this crime unless she performed the action of killing the 
officer, which requires that she was more or less in rational control of her conduct at the time 
of the offense.12 Indeed, there is no reason why a provocation defense (a defense resting on 
the fact that the suspect had lost rational control due to emotion) might not succeed in such 
cases. Similarly, reckless action is action undertaken without due caution under 
circumstances that call for due caution. Although one need not have any goals in particular in 
                                                 
11
 Unlike the common law doctrine of provocation, the Model Penal Code does not require that the source of the 
intense emotion must be a provocation that no reasonable person would have been able to withstand. All that 
the Model Penal Code specifies with respect to this mitigating factor is that the emotion must be present and 
cause the person’s judgments to lose their usual power to determine what the agent will do. See Fletcher 426. 
 
12
 I thank Michael Corrado for bringing up this point and pressing for clarification. 
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order to commit a crime of recklessness, one must be more or less in autonomous control of 
one’s (reckless) actions at the time.13  
 So the reasoning in support of rejecting bias crimes as anti-liberal and unjust that I am 
concerned with here proceeds as follows. Because the criminal law may only punish people 
for those things over which they exercise autonomous control, the criminal law may not 
punish feelings or dispositional states, but it may 1) punish actions and 2) take intentions into 
account when doing so (because agent action just is action on intention). This action 
condition on the just use of the criminal law is a side constraint; that is, whatever reasons a 
government might have to enact a given criminal statute, they cannot override the action 
condition. Consequently, governments must tailor their criminal law doctrine to fit within the 
strictures of the action condition. So even if bias crime laws would be beneficial to society, 
they are nonetheless unjust because they punish feelings and dispositional states and so fail to 
meet the action condition.  
This reasoning opens up an intriguing avenue for someone who (like me) is attracted 
to the action condition but who is unwilling to accept the conclusion that all bias crime 
statutes are really off the table with respect to justice. The avenue is this: what if at least 
some bias elements of crimes are intentions after all? If they are, then so long as they are 
appropriately bad intentions, they can justly be subjected to criminal punishment. The sort of 
badness capable of rendering intentions suitable for special criminal designation and 
                                                 
13
 Crimes of omission may be slightly harder to fit into the present schema, especially if such crimes are 
understood as requiring only the fact of an agent's not having done the required act as opposed to the agent's 
having decided not to do the required act or to do something else instead. However, to the extent that crimes of 
omission require decisions not to perform actions, they present no particular problem here. It is worth noting 
here that crimes of omission often present difficulties for theorists of criminal law, especially liberal theorists. 
Moore, for instance, argues that there are very few actual instances of crimes of omission, and that those 
instances that are in force constitute a sort of curiosity that it is not easy to justify within a liberal criminal law 
system. See Moore, Act and Crime: The Philosophy of Action and its Implications for Criminal Law. New 
York: Clarendon, 1993: 59. 
 7
punishment must be addressed, of course, and will I discuss this in §4. But assuming we can 
work out the details, there is hope here of finding a way to both embrace the action condition 
and support at least some bias crime statutes. In what follows, I will argue that there is such a 
way, and that liberals attracted to the action condition would do well to follow it and grant 
that some carefully constructed bias crime statutes would be just statutes.  
Before I begin, however, two clarifications and caveats are in order. First, although I 
have linked the action condition and the authors who defend it with classical liberalism, I 
mean to suggest neither that all classical liberals are somehow committed to this view nor 
that this view follows straightforwardly from positions held by any of the major figures in the 
classical liberal tradition. Rather, I merely intend to address a problem that arises within a 
particular strand of contemporary thinking about criminal law that plausibly self-identifies 
with this tradition. Second,  although I will argue here that only a narrow subset of the 
criminal actions currently classified as bias crimes may justly be classified as bias crimes, I 
do not mean to suggest that this is because only these bias crimes are morally bad enough to 
deserve special status, or that only these bias crimes reflect an especially depraved character. 
To the contrary, I would be happiest if it were just for governments to use the criminal law to 
extirpate such acts from the cultural scene entirely. But unhappily, justice does not always 
allow us to do what would bring about the very best results, and it does not allow us to do so 
with respect to bias-motivated crime. Nevertheless, the prospects for addressing at least some 
of these crimes through carefully designed legislation are considerably brighter than most 
recent classical liberal treatments of the subject have supposed.  
  
 
 
2. Bias Crime Statutes 
Two distinct types of bias crime statute exist under American law. These are stand-
alone statutes and penalty enhancement statutes.14 Stand-alone statutes establish as criminal 
certain bias-oriented acts that do not have non-biased parallels under criminal law. Stand-
alone statutes nearly always prohibit some kind of expressive behavior that uniquely targets 
the members of protected groups. Anti-cross burning statutes, which exist or have existed in 
several states, are paradigmatic examples of stand alone statutes.15 By contrast, penalty-
enhancement laws establish a more severe punishment for individuals who perform an action 
that is criminal regardless of any bias element, but with a motivation or intention that 
expresses bias against a protected group.16 While stand-alone statutes also present interesting 
philosophical questions, I will not be concerned with them here. Rather, I will consider only 
                                                 
14
 For a discussion of the varieties of bias crime statutes, see Frederick Lawrence. Punishing Hate: Bias Crimes 
under American Law. Cambridge: Harvard, 1999: 91-99. 
 
15
 Interestingly, expression-oriented stand-alone statutes have not fared well in the courts. The US Supreme 
Court established the constitutionality of statutes prohibiting “offensive, derisive or annoying language” in 
general in the landmark case Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (315 U.S. 568 (1942)). However, the same court 
ruled in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (505 U.S. 377 (1992)) that a St. Paul, Minnesota ordinance prohibiting 
expression that might reasonably be expected to "arouse anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of 
race, color, creed, religion or gender” was unconstitutional. The court reasoned that unlike the statute at issue in 
Chaplinsky, the St. Paul ordinance designated specific expressive (group-related) content and was therefore 
unconstitutional. In Black v. Virginia (538 U.S. 343 (2003)), the court struck down a Virginia Statute 
prohibiting cross burning on the grounds that the issue at hand was not significantly different from that of 
R.A.V.  
 
16
 Some bias crime laws are written as stand alone laws, but the crimes they create are identical to already 
existing crimes with respect to everything but motivation. An example of such a statute is Wyoming’s Bias 
Crime law (Wy. Stat. 1997 §6-9-102). For the purposes of this paper, I will not treat these bias crime statutes 
differently from penalty enhancement statutes.  
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whether, how, and to what extent penalty-enhancement laws are compatible with the action 
condition on criminal law.  
 American bias crime laws differ considerably with respect to how they define the bias 
element needed to elevate a criminal offense to bias crime status. We can beneficially divide 
American bias crime statutes into two categories with respect to the language they employ. 
The first category, which we might call the broad category, includes statutes that use phrases 
like ‘because of (bias)’ or ‘by reason of (bias)’ in specifying which criminal actions may be 
prosecuted under them. Here are some examples: 
California—The Penalty for a felony committed because of the victim’s race, 
color, religion, nationality, country of origin, ancestry, disability or sexual 
orientation shall be enhanced one, two or three years in prison, if the person 
acts alone.17 
 
Illinois—A person commits a hate crime when, by reason of the actual or 
perceived race, color, creed, religion, ancestry, gender, sexual orientation, 
physical or mental disability, or national origin of another individual or group 
of individuals, regardless of the existence of any other motivating factor or 
factors, he commits assault, battery, aggravated assault, misdemeanor theft, 
criminal trespass to residence, misdemeanor criminal damage to property, 
criminal trespass to vehicle, criminal trespass to real property, mob action or 
disorderly conduct as these crimes are defined.18 
 
Missouri’s statute is perhaps the broadest of all: 
 
Missouri—A person commits a crime of ethnic intimidation in the first degree 
if, by reason of any motive relating to the race, color, religion, or national 
origin of another individual or group of individuals [he or she damages the 
victim’s property or uses illegal weapons].19 
 
                                                 
17
 Cal. Penal Code 422.75 (emphasis added) 
18
 720 Il. C.S. 5/12-7.1 (emphasis added) 
19
 Mo. Stat. Ann. 574.090  
 10
 Nearly all American bias crime laws, including the federal bias crime statute,20 fit the 
broad model. Consequently, nearly all American prosecutors enjoy a good deal of discretion 
regarding whom to prosecute as a bias criminal. If all that is necessary in order for a crime to 
count as a bias crime is some causal or explanatory relation between the criminal’s choice of 
victim and the victim’s actual or perceived group status, then there is no reason why a 
criminal could not be prosecuted as a bias criminal on account of nothing more than hateful 
feelings, so long as such feelings help to explain her action.  
 A few states, however, reject the broad statute model in favor of a narrow model that 
hinges on criminals’ selection criteria or on criminals’ specific intent. Wisconsin’s statute 
frames bias crime in terms of discriminatory selection:  
Wisconsin—[A person commits a bias crime if he or she] commits a 
crime…[and]  intentionally selects the person against whom the crime is 
committed…in whole or in part because of the actor's belief or perception 
regarding the race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national 
origin or ancestry of that person.21 
 
Discriminatory selection is clearly an intentional concept. If I select some particular 
person P because she is black and I aim to harm a black person, then it is also right to say that 
I intend to harm P because I intend to harm a black person. But the Idaho,22 Michigan,23 
Oklahoma,24 and South Dakota25 statutes all state explicitly that bias crime is a matter of 
                                                 
20
 H.R. 2647 Div. E. 
21Wis. Stat. Ann. 939.645 
22
 Id. Code §18-7902 
23
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §750.147b 
 
24
 Okla. Stat. Ann. Tit.21 §850 
 
25
 S.D. Cod. Laws Ann. 22-19B-1 
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acting on a certain kind of intention. Here is the relevant language from the Michigan statute 
and the Oklahoma statute: 
Michigan—[A person commits a bias crime if she causes injury or property 
damage] with specific intent to intimidate or harass another person because of 
that person’s race, color, religion, gender, or national origin.26 
 
Oklahoma—[A person commits a bias crime if she causes injury or property 
damage] maliciously and with the specific intent to intimidate or harass 
another person because of that person’s race.27 
 
 The criteria that a criminal offense must meet in order to fall under these statutes are 
much more narrowly tailored than the criteria an offense must meet in order to fall under one 
of the broad statutes. In order to successfully prosecute a criminal under a narrow bias crime 
statute, it is necessary for prosecutors to prove something about the intentions of the actor.  
 If we take the action condition seriously, then we must reject all bias crime statutes 
that adhere to the broad model. This is because these statutes allow people to be punished for 
their feelings and values so long as their feelings or values in some way explain how they 
came to behave as they did. However, it seems to me that the narrow model, with its focus on 
criminals’ intentions, presents a more promising route to follow. Before we can pursue this 
line of thought any further, however, we need to consider what sorts of bias elements can be 
considered intentions and why.  
                                                 
26
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §750.147b 
27
 Okla. Stat. Ann. Tit.21 §850 
  
3. Biased Intentions 
 
Frederick Lawrence begins to approach the insight that the bias elements of certain bias 
crimes may be understood in terms of intention.28 According to Lawrence, all bias crimes 
may be understood in terms of intentions. He writes: 
  The perpetrator of this (hate-motivated) crime could be seen as either: 
(1) possessing a mens rea of purpose with respect to the assault, 
along with a motivation of racial bias;  
 
or 
(2) possessing a first-tier mens rea of purpose with respect to the 
parallel crime of assault and a second-tier mens rea of purpose 
with respect to assaulting this victim because of his race. 
 
 The defendant in description (1) "intended" to assault his victim and did so because 
he is a racist.  The defendant in description (2) "intended" to assault an African-American 
and therefore acted with both intent to assault and discriminatory intent as to the selection of 
the victim. 
 In order to assess Lawrence’s move here, we need to consider what it might mean for 
an intention to be biased or discriminatory. And in order to get at this particular sort of 
intention, we need to get at least a cursory grip on intention generally. An intention, we may 
safely say, is a goal or aim, regardless of what else it might be. This rough and ready 
formulation seems to fit especially well in the context of the criminal law. For instance, the 
Model Penal Code does not distinguish acting intentionally from acting “purposely” and 
                                                 
28
 Lawrence 108-9 
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states that “a person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when, if 
the element involves the nature of his conduct or the result thereof, it is his conscious object 
to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result.”29  
 If this is the case, then a discriminatory intention must be a goal or aim that has, in 
some sense, the property of being discriminatory. The most immediately plausible way in 
which an intention might be discriminatory is this; an intention is discriminatory if the 
intending agent aims to achieve a goal such that we cannot describe the goal completely and 
correctly without reference to a particular group or classification of people.30 In the rest of 
this section, I will argue that while Lawrence is wrong to suggest that all biased motives can 
be accurately re-described as biased intentions, it is true that some biased motives can be 
accurately re-described this way. However, the matter of whether such a re-description is 
appropriate hinges entirely on details about the mental state of the criminal at the time of her 
crime, and these details are often, but not always, epistemically underdetermined by 
publically observable facts of the case. Consequently, it is sometimes difficult or impossible 
to say whether a criminal acted on a biased intention. I will argue that in cases in which it is 
not clear whether punishing an action as a bias crime would involve punishing a non-
intentional motive, the deference due to the action condition demands that governments not 
prosecute the action as a bias crime.  
                                                 
29
 MPC §2.02(2)(a) 
 
30
 Two things about this formulation of discriminatory intent are worth noting immediately. First, this framing 
leaves open the possibility that there could be morally praiseworthy discriminatory intentions—aiming to carry 
out affirmative action policies is a plausible candidate here—though hopefully no such discriminatory 
intentions would fall under criminal proscription! Second, the conditions for discriminatory intent are not 
satisfied either by a) goals that in fact involve a group or its members but which can be correctly understood 
without reference to a group or its members or by b) goals that are in some sense caused or explained by a 
feeling about a group or its members. 
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Let’s begin by considering a case of racially motivated crime in which a criminal acts 
on an intention that is both biased and publically accessible.  
Assault at the Party   Geoff, a white man, is a racist who hates Latinos. He has 
watched with loathing and disgust as the population of his town has become 
more heavily Latino over the past several years. One day, he reads in the 
newspaper that the local Latino Chamber of Commerce will be sponsoring a 
street party that will celebrate traditional Latino food, music, and culture. This 
is the last straw for Geoff, so he resolves to assault at least one of the Latino 
street party attendees. True to his resolution, Geoff arrives at the street fair 
and assaults Lisa, a Latina woman in attendance.  
 
The first thing that stands out in this case is that it is utterly unimportant to Geoff’s 
criminal aim that Lisa is the victim of his assault. Given what Geoff is concerned to do at the 
street party, namely assault some unspecified person who meets the criteria of being Latino 
and attending the party, Lisa is completely fungible as a victim. It would have been all the 
same to Geoff if he had come across and harmed some other person, so long as that person 
also met the criteria of being Latino and attending the party. The element of fungibility in 
play in Geoff’s crime stands out even more clearly if we compare Geoff’s crime to another 
(also imaginary) crime in which bias plays a role.  
Assault at the Door   James, a white man, is a racist who hates black people. 
James’s neighbor, Timothy, is a highly successful investment banker, while 
James, who has never been able to hold down a decent job, lives in his 
parents’ basement. Timothy is a black man. On account of his racial hatred, 
James finds Timothy’s success extremely galling. One day after seeing 
Timothy celebrate yet another promotion next door, James resolves to assault 
Timothy if he ever comes around again. The next day, Timothy does stop by 
James’s home to drop off a mistakenly delivered piece of mail. James holds 
true to his resolution and assaults Timothy with a baseball bat.  
 
 James’s criminal aim here is to bring about harm to Timothy and only to Timothy. 
Had Timothy arrived at James’s door with another successful black man, James would not 
have judged his action a success if he had mistakenly succeeded in harming Timothy’s 
companion but not Timothy. This is not, of course, to say that James certainly would not 
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have been pleased with this result; in fact, being a racist, he very well might have been. But 
being pleased with a result is not the same as having a result as a goal. For instance, I might 
be pleased if I accidentally eat a piece of brownie when I meant to eat a bite of ice cream, but 
if I really had intended to go for the ice cream, it would be untrue to say that I succeeded in 
doing what I meant to do, pleasure notwithstanding. Thus, even if James’s pleasure is not 
dependent on harming a particular person, the achievement of his intention is thus dependent. 
By contrast, anyone will do as a victim of Geoff’s assault as long as she is a) Latina and b) at 
the street party. 
 Geoff’s victim in Assault at the Party, then, is fungible in a way in which not all 
victims of bias-motivated crime are fungible. What is important here is not this fungibility 
itself, but rather what it indicates about the structure of Geoff’s intentions. Like James, Geoff 
hates a particular racial group and its members, and this hatred helps to explain the formation 
of Geoff’s intention. But while James has only one relevant intention, Geoff forms and acts 
on two intentions. First, Geoff forms the intention to assault one or more Latino persons at 
the street party. Then, having formed this intention, Geoff forms a second intention once he 
arrives at the street party, namely to assault the particular Latino person he comes across, 
Lisa. Geoff forms and carries out his second intention (to assault Lisa) as a means of carrying 
out his first intention (to assault someone of Latino origin at the street party).   
 This tiered intentional structure maps neatly onto the structure the criminal law 
category of specific intent. As we have already seen, a specific intent crime is a crime of 
which one of the mens rea elements is an intention to bring about some state of affairs other 
than the immediate goal of the action. For instance, burglary is a specific intent crime of 
breaking and entering with the further intent to commit a felony therein. Following the same 
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model, a legislature might pass a statute that designates assault (or whatever) with specific 
intent to harm some member of a protected group as a unique crime. 
  Hurd and Moore, however, would object at this point on the grounds that that unlike 
current specific intent crimes, biased intentions of the sort harbored by Geoff in Assault at 
the Party are not future-directed by rather present-directed.31 According to Hurd, in order for 
a crime to count as a specific intent crime, it must be set apart by a particular goal, and goals 
just are future states of affairs.32 However, it is not plausible that all goals must be future-
directed. In Assault at the Party, for instance, it seems clear enough that Geoff’s aim to 
assault Lisa is distinct from his aim to assault some Latino person at the street fair. After all, 
the states of affairs that would constitute success or frustration with respect to these 
intentions are different (there are states of affairs that would satisfy the aim to assault 
someone Latino at the street party but fail to satisfy the aim to assault Lisa). This is very 
strong evidence that the intentions themselves are distinct. 
 Perhaps, though, the point is not that all goals are future-directed, but rather that only 
future-directed goals are compatible with specific intent as it actually functions in criminal 
law. Hurd and Moore suggest that as a matter of legal fact, specific intent crimes all involve 
actions performed in order to bring about some future aim. It is not at all clear that this is 
true.33 For instance, Dan Kahan makes note of the specific intent crime of killing in order to 
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mutilate a corpse.34 Why could someone not carry out this specific intent crime in such a way 
that the killing and the mutilation occur contemporaneously? Furthermore, even if all specific 
intent crimes that currently exist under American law did involve only future directed 
intentions, it isn’t clear why the law shouldn’t recognize any present-directed specific intent 
crimes, so long as any such crimes involved distinct intentions (like Geoff’s intention in 
Assault at the Party). 
 I suggest, then, that since Geoff acts on two separate but hierarchically ordered 
intentions, one of which cannot be accurately described without reference to a target group, 
the crime in Assault at the Party clearly fits Lawrence’s schema; Geoff acts on a biased 
intention. Consequently, governments may punish crimes like Geoff’s as bias crimes without 
violating the action condition. But what about James’s crime in Assault at the Door? Does it 
feature a biased intention? As we have seen, Timothy is not a fungible victim in the way that 
Lisa is; although James would not have attacked Timothy if Timothy had not been black, not 
any black person at all, or even any successful black man at all, would have served equally 
well as a victim. This is because James’s intentional structure is not tiered in the way Geoff’s 
is; James does not attack Timothy in order to achieve any further end. It is tempting to 
conclude from this fact alone that James does not act on a biased intention, although of 
course he is in the grip of biased passions and values. If James’s victim is not fungible, one 
might suppose, then it can only be right to understand James’s intention as the intention 
simply to attack Timothy, an intention that can be completely and correctly described without 
any reference to a target group.  
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This move is too fast, however, as it overlooks the possibility that James represents 
his aim to himself in terms that do essentially involve a target group. When James strikes out 
at Timothy, he perhaps represents his aim to himself this way:  
J1: I will attack Timothy.  
If this is the case, then no matter what biased values and emotions might be in play, James 
does not act on a biased intention, sense his intention is completely and correctly describable 
without any reference to a target group. However, he might also represent his aim to himself 
this way: 
J2: I will attack Timothy, that black man.  
 
If this is how James represents his aim to himself, then his intention is not completely and 
correctly describable without reference to a target group. But troublingly, there is nothing 
about James’s action that might indicate whether he acts on J1 or J2. 
This epistemic under-determination in cases like James is a serious issue for anyone 
seeking (as I am) to construct bias crime laws that respect the action condition. Since it is not 
necessary to make any reference to a target group in order to completely and correctly 
describe J1, the government violates the action condition if it prosecutes James as a bias 
criminal where J1 is James’s intention. But since it is necessary to reference a target group in 
order to describe J2 completely and correctly, the government does not violate the action 
condition if it prosecutes James as a bias criminal where J2 is James’s intention. And since 
what is at stake here is internal representational content, the matter of which of these 
intentions James acts on is unavailable to public appraisal in a way that the matter of whether 
Geoff attacks Lisa in order to fulfill a further purpose is not. In assessing Geoff’s case, a 
court might be able to determine the fungibility of Geoff’s victim by observing that Lisa was 
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a stranger at the time of the killing and might be able to ascertain the class within which his 
victim was fungible (i.e. Latinos at the party) through interviews, background data about 
Geoff, the time and location of the attack, etc. But in James’s case, it would surely be 
considerably more difficulty (though not, perhaps, impossible) to determine whether James 
acted on J1 or J2. Apart from simply asking James, a court would be hard pressed to gather 
persuasive and acceptable evidence pointing one way or another. 
It is not the case, then, that all bias crimes can be correctly described in terms of 
either biased motives or biased intentions. However, some bias crimes may certainly be re-
described this way, while others are such that there are no public criteria by which to assess 
whether they may be re-described this way. The class of biased crime whose members may 
always be re-described this way includes all and only crimes in which the criminal harms a 
victim in order to harm some member of a group as such. Geoff’s crime in Assault at the 
Party falls into this class. The class of biased crime which may not reliably be re-described 
this way includes all cases in which the criminal acts on a single intention. James’s crime in 
Assault at the Door falls into this class. In these cases, the question of whether the criminal 
acted on a biased intention hinges completely on publically inaccessible facts about how the 
criminal represented her aim to herself.  
What, then, should legislators who are concerned to enact bias crime legislation that 
respects the action condition do about cases like Assault at the Door? I suggest that in virtue 
of the action condition’s status as a side constraint, such legislators must err on the side of 
caution and write their bias crime laws so that crimes like James’s do not meet the criteria for 
bias crime status. If (as I have supposed all along) it is a requirement of justice that 
governments must conduct themselves so as not to violate the action condition, then justice 
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surely does not permit governments to undertake serious risks of violating the action 
condition. Just as the constraint against punishing the innocent demands that juries not risk 
doing so by handing down guilty verdicts when the evidence is inconclusive, the side 
constraint against punishing non-actions demands that governments refrain from passing 
laws that create a non-trivial risk of punishing non-actions. In the final section, I will 
construct a model bias crime law that passes the action condition, and I will make some 
suggestions there about how the language of such a law might be tailored so as to rule out 
cases like James’s as cases of bias crime. First, though, we need to consider why it is that 
crimes of biased intention are fit for harsher punishment than parallel crimes. 
  
 
4. Biased Intentions and Punishment 
I have so far operated on the assumption that if some bias crime statutes should turn out to 
pass the action condition, then there is reason to pass such statutes. But is this true? Are 
biased intentions fit for harsher punishment than parallel, non-biased criminal intentions? 
This is not an issue that is unique to my project here, but one I share with all defenders of 
bias crime statutes of any sort. Nevertheless, it is important to address the point, as there is no 
particular reason to care whether bias crime statutes are compatible with the action condition 
if there is no good reason to pass any such laws. In this section, I will consider this question 
and argue that there is good reason to think that biased intentions are fit for harsher 
punishment. And since I am now concerned only with the sort of bias crime I have argued 
may be criminalized without violation of the action condition, I will focus only on crimes of 
biased intention and the reasons that exist to specially designate and punish crimes of biased 
intention. 
 Arguments in support of bias crime laws may usefully be separated into 
consequentialist arguments and non-consequentialist arguments. And while these arguments 
have (of course) not been offered with my restricted understanding of bias crime in mind, 
there is no clear reason why they should be less applicable to bias crime understood in terms 
of biased intentions. The non-consequentialist arguments for the greater severity of bias 
crimes that have appeared in the literature fall into two broad subclasses. One of these 
subclasses includes arguments that hinge explicitly on the character and values of bias 
criminals. Theorists like Kahan have argued that a primary function of criminal punishment 
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is to express collective disapproval of anti-social values, and that bias criminals possess and 
express values that are well worth condemning.35 The other subclass includes arguments that 
proceed on deontological grounds. The most common line of argument here hinges on the 
apparent fact that when a criminal harms some person as a way of attacking some group of 
which the victim is a member, the criminal treats the victim as merely an instantiation of a 
type rather than as an individual human being. As Michael Blake puts the point, every hate 
crime victim is attacked “for what he is, not who he is.”36 
 Of these non-consequentialist arguments, there can be little doubt that the arguments 
from the expressive function of law are a good deal stronger than the deontological 
arguments, if only because the sort of deontological argument available here is so extremely 
weak. While it is no doubt true that bias criminals attack their victims “for what (they are), 
not who (they are),” this is also true of violent crime generally. Whether a criminal acts in 
order to derive pleasure, money, or some other kind of advantage, the criminal attacks the 
victim for what she is, namely a means to a chosen end. Only in very rare cases of targeted 
crime, such as stalking and certain forms of domestic violence, does a criminal victimize 
someone because of who she is. The arguments from expression, by contrast, are quite strong 
if the basic premise that the criminal law ought to be in the business of condemning bad 
values is granted. After all, the bias criminal’s values are paradigmatically wicked and anti-
social values. However, the notion that the quality of a person’s values in any way licenses 
the government to punish her (or to punish her more harshly) is in deep and obvious tension 
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with the liberal take on the criminal law that underwrites the action condition. The action has 
nothing to say about whether governments ought to use punishment as a way of expressing 
outrage or disapproval. But it does rule out any view on which severity of punishment ought 
to track perceived iniquity of values. Even if a government were to refrain from punishing 
values until values revealed themselves through actions, that government would clearly 
violate the action condition if it were to make severity of post-action punishment wholly or 
partially a function of how bad the criminal’s values were at the time of the crime.  
 The other sort of argument, which depends on the unique and serious harm done by 
bias crime, shows much more promise. When a criminal commits a crime against an 
individual in order to commit a crime against a group, the entire group is harmed by loss of 
security and even self-respect. Furthermore, criminal acts of biased intention exacerbate 
existing group tensions that are harmful to the greater society in which the groups are 
situated. In this way, the scope of harm caused by crime of biased intention reaches not only 
beyond individual victims to the groups in which they live, but beyond these groups to the 
greater society in which these groups exist and interact with each other. These considerations 
are at least very plausible, and they present no obvious problem for the action condition or 
the liberal view of the criminal law that supports the action condition.  
 Blake has challenged this kind of argument for bias crime laws generally (and would 
no doubt likewise challenge such argumentation in support of laws singling out crimes of 
biased intention) on the grounds that there is no principled way to stake out a particular set of 
groups for protection. American bias crime laws protect the members of what have often 
been called ‘identity groups,’ or groups through which members understand themselves and 
their place in society. Groups based on gender, race, sexuality, and religion are all identity 
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groups, and these are the groups typically protected by bias crime laws. But according to 
Blake, any argument that is successful in support of bias crime laws that protect identity 
groups gives equal support to including non-identity groups such as “geeks” and the 
homeless.37 Far from being groups from within which individuals develop a positive 
understanding of who they are and how they fit into society, these are groups of which 
people typically do not want to be members and from which people typically try to exit as 
quickly as possible. With respect to harm-based arguments for greater punishment, Blake has 
this to say: 
In both cases [that of identity groups and that of non-identity groups], 
individuals are made aware that they are subject to a threat not shared by other 
people; they are made vulnerable in a way that people are not made vulnerable 
by the existence of random muggings…What matters most, it seems, is not 
whether the individual in question sees herself as a member of this group for 
purposes of self-identification, but whether or not the attacker identifies the 
individual as a member of that group.38 
 
I do not think Blake’s criticism here is successful. This is because Blake ignores the 
harm done by crime from biased intentions to the relations between identity groups. In a 
society like ours, identity groups are the subjects of long standing and destructive tensions 
and conflicts. Relations between race groups, which though on the mend are still very 
unstable, are a perfect example. When there is a long standing, deep seeded antipathy 
between large-scale-identity groups, this negatively affects not only the members of the less 
fortunate group or groups, but the entire society in which the involved identity groups have 
their places. For instance, to the extent that the American racial identity groups of blacks and 
whites are in a state of only sometimes restrained antipathy and distrust toward one another, 
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all of American society is very much the worse off. Even those who are neither black nor 
white have to live amidst entirely unnecessary fear, distrust, and violence that affects not 
only their own projects, but their ability to include persons of all races in their lives without 
fear of such fear, distrust, and violence. Furthermore, as Andrew Altman has pointed out, it is 
surely detrimental to a functioning democracy that depends on all of its members as 
participants in public discourse for large swaths of its citizenry to be opposed to each other 
along jagged fault lines.39 Crime that is committed with intentions that are irreducibly 
targeted against major identity groups exacerbates these fault lines and is thus uniquely 
damaging to society as a whole.  
 There is, of course, nothing necessary about the unique position of identity groups in 
our society that makes it possible for biased crime against members of these groups to do so 
much damage to society as a whole. It might have been the case, and may yet come to be the 
case, that biased crime against some or all non-identity groups is equally or more damaging 
than biased crime that targets identity groups. Under such circumstances, it would be proper 
for bias crime statutes to include these non-identity groups in their provisions (or perhaps for 
such laws to be repealed entirely).  
 This response to Blake also answers a worry from Hurd and Moore, who complain 
that bias crime laws always treat biased crime as a proxy for some kind of harm (say fear 
among members of a community) that the criminal law could address directly.40 As Hurd and 
Moore admit, proxies only present a problem when they are what we might call ‘loose’ 
proxies, or proxies that do not pick out (or come close to picking out) all and only cases of 
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some particular sort of harm. But if I am right that bad relations between identity groups are 
uniquely positioned to do harm to a society as a whole, punishing crimes of biased intention 
against large-scale identity groups is not a loose proxy. Instead, it is a tight proxy that zeroes 
in on a unique and serious sort of harm. 
 I suggest, then, that it is very plausible that crimes committed from biased intentions 
are harmful in a way that is sufficiently serious and unique to justify bias crime legislation. 
But in light of the foregoing discussion, it is clear that no existing bias crime statute model 
will do. In the final section that follows, I will discuss how a legislature might draft a bias 
crime law that meets the action condition.  
  
 
 
5. New Bias Crime Statutes 
 
Unlike existing bias crime legislation, which simply calls for higher sentences for existing 
crimes committed under the circumstance of a biased motive, bias crime statutes of the sort I 
have argued for would be entirely new crimes specified by mentes reae of purpose. The mens 
rea for murder, for example, is a state of intent (or in some cases a state of knowledge) with 
respect to the death of the victim. The mens rea of bias crime would be a state of intent with 
respect to a specified group. For example, the mens rea of bias murder would be the intention 
to bring about the death of a member of some group as such. It is a deficiency of existing bias 
crime laws is that they typically do not create new crimes (and with them new sentences), but 
rather call for higher penalties for only some instances of existing crimes.41 It is much more 
desirable to maintain a tight one-to-one correlation between crime-types and sentencing 
rules, and bias crime laws of the sort I have in mind would do just this. 
 But what would the language of such statutes be like? Of the types of existing bias 
crime statutes surveyed at the outset, the ‘specific intent’ model is by far the closest to what 
the restriction of bias crime to biased intention demands. Here is Michigan’s specific intent 
bias statute again: 
Michigan—[A person commits a bias crime if she causes injury or property 
damage] with specific intent to intimidate or harass another person because of 
that person’s race, color, religion, gender, or national origin.42 
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 Even this statutory model, however, will not quite do. This is true for two reasons. 
Most obviously, this model is restricted to intimidation and harassment, which is clearly 
unsatisfactory. A more serious problem, though, is that the language employed here is 
ambiguous in a way that fails to rule out cases like Assault at the Door, in which it is not 
possible to determine whether the criminal acted with a biased intention. Supposing that the 
language of this statute were expanded to encompass violent crime, there is no reason why 
James could not be prosecuted under it. After all, even though it not clear whether a complete 
and correct description of James’s intention is possible without reference to a target group, it 
is clear James forms an intention to kill a particular person and that he does so “because of” 
feelings intimately bound up with the race of the victim. A bias crime law must be written so 
as to rule out bias crime prosecutions in unclear cases like Assault at the Door if it is to meet 
the action condition.  
 It seems that in order to make sure that cases in which it is not clear whether the 
criminal acted on a biased intention are not counted as bias crimes, legislatures would do best 
to write bias crime legislation so that a crime must match the sort of two-tiered intentional 
structure featured in Assault at the Party. While writing the law this way would of course 
result in some actual cases of crime of biased intention not being prosecuted as such, 
explicitly invoking the two-tiered intentional structure would effectively prevent bias crime 
prosecution in the absence of a biased intention. Language specifically requiring that a crime 
meet the two-tiered structure in order to count as a bias crime would not pick out all crimes 
of biased intention, but it would pick out only crimes of biased intention.  
I suggest, then, that an ideal bias crime statute would expressly specify bias crime as 
crime that features 1) a first-tier intention to harm some particular person or persons and 2) a 
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second-tier intention to harm a member of a group as such by harming the person picked out 
by the first-tier intention. The best language for this task would probably be ‘in order to’ 
language. Here is a sample bias crime statute that meets the standards I have argued for here: 
 
Sample Bias Crime Law 
 
A person commits a bias crime if he or she: 
 
a) commits a felony or misdemeanor;  
 
b) against a person whom he or she believes, truly or falsely, to be a 
member of a group defined by race, color, religion, gender, national 
origin, sexual orientation, or sexual identity; 
 
c) in order to achieve the goal of committing a criminal act against some 
member of the group defined by race, color, religion, gender, national 
origin, sexual orientation, or sexual identity of which he or she 
believes the victim to be a member. 
 
 However, a problem arises here. It is oftentimes the case that criminals victimize a 
particular individual in order to victimize some member of a group, but only in order to 
achieve some still further goal. Suppose for instance, that a criminal is interested in stealing 
wallets, and that she believes (for whatever reason) that white women are least likely to 
effectively resist. Such a criminal might mug a particular white woman in order to achieve 
the goal of mugging some white woman, but only to achieve the ultimate goal of securing a 
wallet with as little resistance as possible. Should legislatures write bias crime laws so as to 
include crimes like this as bias crimes? 
 It is worth noting that this is not a problem that is unique to my take on bias crime 
laws. Indeed, any defender of bias crime laws of any sort must face this issue, (although, 
unfortunately, nearly all American legislatures have failed to address it clearly). 
Nevertheless, something must be said about this nagging problem. I suggest that since the 
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reason why legislatures ought to pass bias crime laws in the first place is a function of the 
harm they do to society as a whole, the question of whether or not to count crimes like that of 
the mugger as bias crimes depends on whether they are likely to be harmful to the same 
degree as crimes in which harming a member of a group is the ultimate end. And although I 
cannot be sure about this, it seems very likely that crimes like that of the white woman-
seeking mugger are likely to be very similarly harmful. If members of a particular identity 
group understand themselves to be considered easy targets by another identity group, this is 
likely to fan the flames of irreducibly identity group-oriented anger, mistrust, and violence 
just as effectively as a self-understanding engendered by crimes in which attacking the group 
is the ultimate goal. This point is, however, entirely empirical and contingent, and I welcome 
research that might shed better light on it.  
  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
At the outset, I presented a troubling problem that has come up in the philosophical literature 
on bias crime laws. There is strong support in both the liberal political tradition and Anglo-
American law doctrine for the action condition, which is a side constraint that requires 
governments to restrict their use of the criminal law in such a way that they do not punish 
anything but what is under the autonomous control of agents. The action condition rules out 
punishing people for their feelings and values, including their biased and otherwise abhorrent 
feelings and values. But crime committed from bias does seem to be a uniquely pernicious 
force in our society, and it is truly tragic if justice requires that governments do nothing to 
specifically target such crime. I have argued that there is a partial resolution to this problem; 
the bias elements of some bias crimes are intentions, and since intentions may be punished 
without violating the act condition, it is possible to construct limited bias crime laws that 
respect the action condition. Furthermore, I argued that there is good reason to reject several 
arguments to the effect that crimes of biased intention against large-scale identity groups are 
not uniquely harmful. It is my hope that that a scheme of bias crime legislation like the one I 
have suggested could appeal sufficiently to thinkers on both sides of the bias crime debate to 
usher in legislation that respects the liberty and autonomy of citizens while still doing much 
to tend to the wounds cut by crimes of biased intention.  
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